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CARGO DAMAGE LIABILITY: AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY JURISPRUDENCE
IN EXTREMIS
A recurring questionfacing admiralty courts is which of three parties--4he cargo
carrying vessel, the noncarrying vessel, or the cargo owners-should bear the loss of
cargo damage resultingfrom a both-to-blame maritime accident. A recent Supreme
Court decision that dealt with hull damage held that liability is to be allocated in
proportion to each party'sfault whenever possible. The ideal oproportionate liabil-
ity is complicated, however, by the carrying vessel's ability to avoid or limit its liabil-
ity. Thus, either the noncarrying vessel is subject to disproportionate liability or the
cargo owner receives an incomplete recovery Two district courts have addressed the
issue of who should bear the loss and have reached contrary conclusions. This Note
analyzes both decisions and concludes that neither court reached the most equitable
result under the circumstances. To achieve equitable resolutions of such disputes,
this Note then proposes a modification of joint and several liability--the current
method used by most admiralty courts to assign cargo damage liability. The Note
concludes with an examination ofimminent statutory changes in this area and argues
that the proposed modfication ofjoint and several liability is consistent with such
impending changes.
INTRODUCTION
ACONTROVERSY exists as to the proper extent and theoreti-
cal underpinnings of cargo damage recovery in "both-to-
blame"' maritime collisions. The conflict stems largely from a
history of piecemeal attempts by Congress2 and the courts3 to bal-
ance the opposing interests of shipowners and cargo.4
Recently, the United States Supreme Court again attempted to
1. In the context of admiralty law, "both-to-blame" refers to the situation in which
two or more ships are concurrently negligent. For a discussion of the both-to-blame clause,
which contractually allocates liability for cargo damage, see notes 88-94 infra and accom-
panying text.
2. Congress has provided shipowners with various defenses to damage actions by
cargo, see note 4 infra. For example, if a shipowner exercises due diligence to provide a
seaworthy ship for the carriage of cargo, the shipowner may be exonerated from liability
for damage to cargo resulting from the negligent operation of the ship. This exemption
from liability was originally enacted in the Hater Act, Ch. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445 (1893)
(current version at 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976), and was substantially reenacted in 1936 in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), Pub. L. No. 74-521, § 4(2)(a), 49 Stat. 1207
(codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976)).
In addition, a shipowner may be permitted under certain circumstances to limit its lia-
bility to the dollar value of its interest in the vessel at the end of the voyage. The Limita-
tion of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
3. See notes 64-74 infra and accompanying text.
4. This Note will use the term "cargo" to refer not onlyto goods carried aboard ship
but also to the owner of such goods or that owner's subrogated underwriter.
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balance those competing interests. In United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co. ,' the Court abrogated the ancient rule of admiralty
which required that damages arising from a both-to-blame colli-
sion be divided equally among the at-fault parties regardless of
relative degrees of fault.6 In place of "divided damages"7 the
Court adopted a rule of proportionate fault under which liability
for damages will be allocated on the basis of comparative fault
whenever possible.8
The Court expressed three reasons for abandoning the rule of
divided damages. First, the reasoning which purported to support
the rule was shown to be specious: equal division of damages
often failed to produce equitable results, and also did not seem
likely to induce care and vigilance in navigation.' Second, contin-
ued adherence to the rule, which was no longer the prevailing
standard among major maritime nations, ' 0 would not promote the
compelling interest of international uniformity in admiralty."
Abandonment of the rule, however, with a simultaneous judicial
adoption of comparative negligence would serve the salutary pur-
pose of reducing international forum shopping by conforming
American law to the rule of comparative fault contained in the
Brussels Collision Convention of 1910.12 Finally, the Court recog-
nized that comparative negligence had long been applied in per-
sonal injury suits in admiralty.' 3
The Supreme Court intended the Reliable Transfer rule of pro-
portionate fault to facilitate the equitable allocation of responsi-
5. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
6. Id at 410-11.
7. The rule of "divided damages" required the equal division of property damages
among all parties guilty of fault, regardless of respective levels of fault. The rule was incor-
porated into American law by the Supreme Court's decision in The Schooner Catharine v.
Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). For an example of the actual application of the
rule, see note 64 infra.
8. 421 U.S. at 411.
9. Id at 402-03.
10. Id at 403-04.
11. Kasanin, Cargo Rights andResponsibilities in Collision Cases, 51 TuL. L. REv. 880,
893 (1977).
12. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Re-
spect to Collisions Between Vessels, signed at Brussels, September 23, 1910, reprinted in 8
BRITISH SHIPPING LAws, N. SINGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIP-
PING 1337 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Collision Convention]. See 421 U.S.
at 403-04.
13. 421 U.S. at 407.
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bility for hull damage due to collisions and allisions. 14 The
adoption of the rule did not, however, resolve the question regard-
ing the manner in which proportionate fault affected the rights of
cargo or other third parties suffering damage in a both-to-blame
collision.' 5 The language of the Court's holding, however, is
broad enough to encompass cargo damages:
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by
their fault to cause properly damage in a maritime collision or
stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among
the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their
fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated
equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is
not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their
fault. 16
The fundamental question which remains and which will be ad-
dressed by this Note is whether this proportionate fault rule com-
pels the modification or abolition of joint and several liability.' 7
The importance of this issue is underscored by a consideration
of the impact of shipowners' defenses on damage claims. In a typ-
ical situation, where the owner of the carrying vessel has exercised
due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel, it is entitled to in-
voke the immunity provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA).' 8 Cargo then has no cause of action against the
carrier, but can seek recovery from any other at-fault party.
Under the prevailing American rule of joint and several liability,
cargo would be able to recover a judgment for one hundred per-
cent of its damages from an at-fault party. 9
A primary justification for holding one vessel liable for one
hundred percent of cargo damage caused by two or more vessels is
the availability of an action for contribution.20 Thus, even if a
noncarrier were initially found liable for all damage to cargo, lia-
14. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
An allision is defined as "[tihe running of one vessel into or against another, as distin-
guished from a collision, ie., the running of two vessels against each other." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 100 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
15. See Healy & Koster, Reliable Transfer Company v. United States: Proportional
Fault Rule, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 293, 298 (1975).
16. 421 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
17. See notes 160-72 infra and accompanying text.
18. COGSA §§ 4(2)(a)-4(2)(q), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1304(2)(a)-1304(2)(q) (1976).
19. American collision law does not impute the fault of carrier to cargo. G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 945 (2d ed. 1975). It is thus more favorable to
cargo than the law of nations adhering to the Brussels Collision Convention. See note 12
supra and accompanying text.
20. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899). For a full discussion of this case and its
[Vol. 30:816
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bility ultimately could be apportioned according to fault in an ac-
tion for contribution.
In response to an action for contribution, however, the carrier
can petition the court to limit its liability2 to the value of the ship
after the collision plus any outstanding freight.22 Moreover, if the
carrying vessel were completely destroyed in the collision, the
owner could limit the dollar amount of liability to the amount of
carriage fees yet to be paid. Almost inevitably, this amount will
be less than the dollar amount of the carrier's proportionate fault.
Consequently, a portion of the noncarrier's claim for contribution
will remain unsatisfied. This example demonstrates that if carrier
is able to avoid or limit liability, disproportionate liability is im-
posed upon noncarrier in direct contradiction to Reliable Transfer.
It is likely that this contradiction will be resolved in the fore-
seeable future. On March 30, 1978, the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Carriage of Goods by Sea adopted a new text known
as the "Hamburg Rules. '23 This Convention, if ratified by the
United States Senate, would eliminate carriers' exemption from
liability to cargo for damage arising from negligent navigation.24
Cargo would thus no longer be limited to an action against non-
carrier. In addition, on May 4, 1979, the Maritime Law Associa-
tion of the United States published a proposal for new legislation
which radically alters the nature of shipowners' limitation of lia-
bility.25  In place of the arbitrary limitation to the value of the
vessel and freight, the proposed legislation relates the level of lim-
itation to the size of the vessel. The larger the vessel, the greater
dollar amount the owner would be required to pay into a "fund"26
effect upon the operation of the Harter Act exemption from liability to cargo for damage
due to negligent navigation, see notes 71-74 infra and accompanying text.
21. Section 183(a) of the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act limits the carrier's
liability to the dollar value of the owner's interest in the vessel at the end of the voyage. 46
U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
22. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 120 (1871). The term "freight"
refers to the fee charged for the carriage of goods, not the cargo itself.
23. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 89/13 (1978), reprinted in THE MARITIME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 613
6824-47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as the Hamburg Rules]. As of April 30, 1979, 27 nations,
including the United States, had signed the Convention. Basnayake, Introduction: Origins
of the 1978 Hamburg Rules, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 353, 355 (1979).
24. Hamburg Rules, supra note 23, art. 5 1, at 6827.
25. Report of the Joint Committee of the Comite Maritime International and Limitation
ofLiability, reprinted in THE MARITIME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 619 (May 4, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Limitation Act].
26. The limitation of liability "fund" statutorily determines the maximum dollar
amount of a shipowner's liability for a particular occurrence. Id § 6, at 7077-78.
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out of which damage claims could be satisfied.
Until such time as Congress enacts new legislation to govern
cargo damage allocation, the admiralty courts must fulfill their
obligation to act as an interstitial rule-making institution.27 The
Supreme Court sanctioned this approach in Reliable Transfer
when it recognized its traditional authority and duty to exercise
broad powers of equity to fashion rules governing maritime af-
fairs.28 The Court's decision and reasoning further indicate a
broad conception of its power to reject longstanding rules in re-
sponse to a felt need for reform.
The immediate issue faced by the admiralty courts is whether
cargo or noncarrier should bear the risk of an incomplete recovery
for cargo damage. As a practical matter, the answer depends
upon when liability is apportioned. If apportionment occurs as an
initial step in cargo's action for damages, cargo may recover only
a proportionate amount of damages from each defendant. In such
a case, cargo bears the risk of carrier limiting its liability. On the
other hand, if apportionment of liability takes place in a subse-
quent action among defendants for contribution,29 cargo will be
able to recover one hundred percent of its damages from any one
defendant. This scheme places the risk of carrier's limitation of
liability on noncarrier.
The issue of who should bear the risk of an incomplete cargo
recovery has been addressed by two federal district courts since
Reliable Transfer.30 In Complaint of Flota Mercante Grancolombi-
ana, S.A. (Flota),3' the District Court for the Southern District of
27. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. 421 U.S. at 409.
29. One commentator notes that the authorities who have addressed the issue support
the position that liabiliy in Reliable Transfer refers to "ultimate" liability after contribu-
tion. Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REv. 759,
804 (1977). While Reliable Transfer is clearly open to the interpretation that joint and
several liability remains viable in the context of comparative negligence, this Note argues
to the contrary. Joint and several liability is inherently inconsistent with comparative neg-
ligence and thus, the admiralty courts should exercise their equitable powers to prevent the
injustice which may be visited upon the noncarrying vessel by holding it jointly and sever-
ally liable for all damages to cargo. See notes 113-117 infra and accompanying text.
30. The Second Circuit also considered cargo damage allocation in light of Reliable
Transfer, but in a case which did not involve a collision. Vana Trading Co. v. S.S. "Mette
Skou", 556 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977). The court imposed a very
strict burden of proof upon the shipowner: it required the shipowner to prove the precise
level of change attributable to causes excepted by COGSA or answer for 100% of cargo's
damage. Id at 105. See notes 181-82 supra and accompanying text.
31. 440 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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New York narrowly read the proportionate fault rule and held
that the carrier and noncarrier involved in a collision were liable
as joint tortfeasors. Since the carrier had limited its liability, the
court held the noncarrying vessel liable for one hundred percent
of cargo's damage.32 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana reached the opposite conclusion in Alamo Chemical
Transportation Co. v. M/V Overseas Valdes (Alamo). The court
liberally interpreted the proportionate fault rule of Reliable Trans-
fer and limited cargo to a several recovery against each
tortfeasor.34 In rejecting joint and several liability, the Alamo
court assumed that cargo damages were divisible under the pro-
portionate fault rule, and that causation and liability were sepa-
rately assignable to each defendant.35
The district courts in Flota and Alamo reached contrary con-
clusions as to whether Reliable Transfer implicitly abolished joint
and several liability for cargo damage. It is evident that this con-
flict is a result of the inconsistent policy goals of the present ship-
owner defenses36 and the rule of proportionate fault.37 This Note
argues, however, that the conflict can be resolved. Admiralty
courts can (and should) exercise their broad equitable powers38 to
establish new rules of liability which do not place the burden of an
incomplete recovery on noncarrier.39
This Note suggests one such new rule which modifies, but does
not abolish, joint and several liability.4" It is suggested here that
noncarrier should be liable to the extent of its own fault, plus any
part of carrier's liability recoverable by contribution. To place
this rule in context, the Note first examines the historical develop-
ment of cargo damage liability. Next, it argues that the Flota and
Alamo decisions did not properly reconcile joint and several
liabilty with Reliable Transfer.4' The Note then suggests general
guidelines for fashioning new rules of liability which will effectu-
32. Id at 725.
33. 469 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. La. 1979).
34. Id at 215.
35. Id The court's "assumptions" are supported by the Supreme Court's statement in
Reliable Transfer that damages should be divided equally only in those rare instances
when it is impossible to ascertain relative degrees of fault. 421 U.S. at 411.
36. See notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
37. See notes 5-16 supra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 165-66 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 167-69 infra and accompanying text.
40. See note 170 infra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 96-148 infra and accompanying text.
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ate proportionate fault,4 2 in addition to proposing its own modifi-
cation of joint and several liability.43 Finally, the Note concludes
with a discussion of new statutory developments which will im-
pact directly on cargo damage claims.'
I. THE HISTORY OF CARGO DAMAGE LIABILITY
The difficulty of applying the Reliable Transfer rule of propor-
tionate fault to cargo damage claims cannot be fully appreciated
without an examination of the history of American admiralty ju-
risprudence. At various times, Congress, 45 the courtS,46 and ship-
owners 47 have sought to balance the rights and liabilities of parties
to ocean carriage. The resulting patchwork of conflicting rules
and policy goals is the context within which Reliable Transfer
must be interpreted.
At common law, the ocean carrier was liable as an insurer of
cargo.48 Thus, even if two vessels were at fault in a collision,
cargo could recover one hundred percent of its damage from the
carrier. After the United States recognized the rule of divided
damages in 1855,49 cargo had an action for fifty percent of its
damages against both negligent vessels, regardless of their actual
levels of fault. By 1876, cargo gained the advantage of asserting
joint and several liability, whereby one vessel could be held liable
for one hundred percent of damages though not one hundred per-
cent at fault.5 ° In The Milan,5' the Engligh High Court of Admi-
ralty held that cargo damage, like hull damage, must be divided
into moieties regardless of fault. 2 Thus, cargo recovered only
half of its damages from the noncarrying vessel. This denial of
42. See notes 164-69 infra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 170-73 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 173-95 infra and accompanying text.
45. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
46. See text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
47. See notes 88-94 infra and accompanying text.
48. Kasanin, supra note 11, at 882.
49. The divided damages rule, dating back to at least the year 1150 with the Laws of
Oleron, was incorporated into American law by the Supreme Court in the Schooner Catha-
rine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). See United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397 n.3 (1975).
50. See notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text. This rule continues to be followed
by American Admiralty courts today. See generaly Staring, Contribution and Division of
Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 304 (1957).
51. 167 Eng. Rep. 167 (Adm. 1861).
52. Id at 176. See Owen, supra note 29, for a thorough treatment of the history of
collision law. The author traces the development of collision law from ancient times to the
present in both England and the United States.
[Vol. 30:816
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joint and several liability for property damage was incorporated
into the Brussels Collision Convention of 19 101 and continued in
an altered state in English admiralty law after the Maritime Con-
ventions Act of 191 1.54
In the years following the American Civil War, the safety, vol-
ume, and speed of ocean carriage increased. In order to reduce
the liability otherwise imposed upon the carrier, shipowners wrote
exculpatory clauses into bills of lading. 56 Although the carrier
could not contract out of such fundamental duties as that of fur-
nishing a seaworthy vessel,57 shipowners did exploit their then su-
perior economic position to exact increasingly burdensome
exculpatory clauses from cargo shippers.58 Congress and the
Supreme Court both responded to this by balancing in seemingly
inconsistent ways the rights and obligations of the parties to ocean
carriage.59
53. See note 12 supra.
54. Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.57, §§ 1-10. There is an impor-
tant difference between the 1910 Collision Convention and the Maritime Conventions Act
which carried it into effect. The Convention retains joint and several liability for personal
injury or death actions but excludes it for property damage claims. Art. 4, Brussels Colli-
sion Convention, supra note 12, at 1338. The Maritime Conventions Act, however, is more
favorable to those suffering property damage. While cargo would not have a joint and
several claim against any of the at-fault vessels, if a vessel is itself free of fault and is
damaged due to the combined fault of two other vessels, the innocent ship would be enti-
tled to a joint and several judgment against either of the two other vessels. Brandon, Ap-
portionment of Liabiliy in British Courts Under the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, 51
TUL. L. REv. 1025, 1033 (1977). See also Owen, supra note 29.
55. A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 119 (4th ed. 1953).
56. The bill of lading may serve as a receipt for cargo received on board, as a contract
of carriage, or as a negotiable document of title. Id at 120.
57. During most of the nineteenth century, the clauses which exempted carrier from
liability for damage to cargo were subject to an "overriding obligation" to furnish a sea-
worthy vessel. Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1859); 0. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 19, at 140. The Harter Act of 1893 altered the obligation to one of
exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. See Chamlee, The Absolute War-
ranty of Seaworhiness." A History and Comparative Study, 24 MERCER L. REV. 519, 525
(1973).
58. The exculpatory clauses written into bills of lading by shipowners became so ex-
tensive that they essentially constituted adhesion contracts. Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v.
S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963).
59. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 142-43; see notes 56-74 infra and
accompanying text.
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A. Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Balance the Opposing
Interests of Shipowner and Cargo
The Harter Act,60 enacted in 1893, relieved carriers of their
insurers' liability, but precluded them from avoiding certain obli-
gations to cargo. The errors and events for which shipowners
were not to be held liable were set out explicitly,6' and any further
limitation of liability was prohibited.62  Notably, an exemption
from liability was provided for negligent operation of the ship,63
even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that clauses
60. Ch. 105, §§ 1-8, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196
(1976)).
61. 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976). The exculpatory provision currently in force is set out in
§ 4(2) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (1976):
(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage aris-
ing or resulting from-
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of
the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship;
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier,
(c) Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;
(d) Act of God;
(e) Act of war,
(f) Act of public enemies;
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers, or people, or seizure under legal
process;
(h) Quarantine restrictions;
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or repre-
sentative;
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labor from whatever cause,
whether partial or general: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to relieve a carrier from responsibility for the carrier's own acts;
(k) Riots and civil commotions;
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea;
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from
inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods;
(n) Insufficiency of packing;
(o) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks;
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence; and
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier
and without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the
burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to
show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect
of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
See also, United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 245 (1952). (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
62. Harter Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1976); COGSA § 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1976).
One observer notes: "The shipowner was specifically exonerated from all liability caused
by negligence in the navigation and management of the vessel, providing the vessel was
seaworthy. However, the shipowner could not further insulate himself from liability for
loss or damage to the cargo; such stipulations were declared null and void." Note, Admi-
rally-Contribution for Concurrent Causation in Cargo Cases, 52 TUL. L. REv. 856, 858
(1978).
63. Harter Act § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976), COGSA § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)
(1976).
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to that effect in bills of lading were unlawful.64
Although the Harter Act removed cargo's right to recover
damages from the carrier in the vast majority of collision cases, it
did not explicitly define the new scope of cargo's recovery. The
relevant exemption provision did not resolve the issue as it merely
stated that "neither the vessel, her owner or owners, shall become
or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or
errors in navigation. ... 65 This language is subject to two pos-
sible interpretations with respect to cargo damage. Congress ei-
ther intended that cargo itself bear the amount of loss
proportional to the fault of the carrier as determined by the di-
vided damages rule, or it intended to allow a joint and several
recovery against any negligent party except carrier. The legisla-
tive history narrows the choice as it indicates that the exemption
provision was designed to operate for the benefit of the shipowner
at the expense of cargo.66
If joint and several liability is the proper interpretation, cargo
has suffered little detriment by the provision; its only loss is of one
of its possible sources of recovery. On the other hand, any advan-
tage to carrier will be purely a function of chance. For example, if
cargo aboard two negligent vessels is damaged in equal degree,
neither shipowner will enjoy a net savings if joint and several lia-
bility survives in the context of the Harter Act. Rather, carrier
benefits only when the damage sustained by its cargo exceeds that
sustained by the other vessel's cargo. Moreover, this interpreta-
tion of the Harter Act creates a further anomalous result. If car-
rier is wholly at fault, cargo recovers nothing. If, however, as is
far more likely, both vessels are at fault, cargo can recover one
hundred percent of its damages from noncarrier.
Legislative efforts to balance the risks between carrier, noncar-
rier, and cargo were accompanied by Supreme Court decisions at-
tempting to do the same. In 1855, the Court adopted the rule of
divided damages in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson.67 This
decision multiplied the number of defendants to whom cargo
64. Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
65. Harter Act § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976).
66. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 142-43.
67. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). If two vessels are involved in a collision, the rule of
divided damages requires the vessel which suffers less damage to pay to the more severely
damaged vessel one half of the difference in the amount of damage respectively suffered,
resulting in an equalization of damages. For example, if a collision between ships A and B
results in damages amounting to $100,000 for A and $200,000 for B, ship A would be
obliged to pay $50,000 to B in order to equalize damages at $150,000 each.
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could turn for recovery of damage as each of the vessels involved
became liable for an equal part of the damages.68 Although the
adoption of the rule of divided damages did not require a con-
comitant acceptance of joint and several liability, the Court held
in 1876 that if cargo were unable to recover damages from one
vessel, it had an action for one hundred percent of damages from
the other.69  Later that year, the Court recognized the uncondi-
tional right of cargo to recover a joint and several judgment from
any at-fault noncarrying vessel.7°
Shipowners were naturally adverse to paying one hundred per-
cent of the damages to cargo carried aboard another vessel. Thus,
six years after passage of the Harter Act, the Supreme Court
granted shipowners relief from the operation of a statute which
was purportedly enacted for their benefit. The Court held in The
Chattahoochee"' that the amount paid by a shipowner in satisfac-
tion of a cargo damage claim could be included in that vessel's
calculation of damage in a subsequent action for contribution.7 2
By including the amount paid in satisfaction of cargo damage,
noncarrier had an opportunity to recoup part of that amount from
carrier; thus, the risk of damage to cargo aboard the carrying ves-
sel was no longer borne solely by noncarrier. 73 The rule of Chatta-
68. Under the rule of divided damages all parties guilty of fault share equally in the
damages arising from a collision. Thus, cargo damage is not compensated by carrier alone
as insurer, but is apportioned equally among the at-fault parties.
69. The Alabama and the Game-cock, 92 U.S. 695 (1876).
70. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876). Notably, The Atlas greatly expanded the rights of
cargo by allowing it to proceed against any available defendant without first establishing
the inability of other potential defendants to answer a judgment. Id at 319. The Court
stated:
Parties without fault, such as shippers and consignees, bear no part of the loss
in collision suits, and are entitled to full compensation for the damage which they
suffer from the wrong-doers, and they may pursue their remedy in personam, ei-
ther at common law or in the admiralty, against the wrong-doers or any one or
more of them, whether they elect to proceed at law or in the admiralty courts.
Id This Note argues that passage of the Harter Act implicitly overruled the holding of
The Atlas that cargo had an unqualified right to a full recovery for damage. See notes
64-66 supra and accompanying text.
71. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
72. Id at 555. The Chattahoochee granted noncarrier an action for contribution for
cargo damage which would be combined with its action for division of hull damage.
73. Under the standard operation of the divided damages rule, carrier and noncarrier
equalize hull damage by dividing the difference between respective damages sustained.
See note 66 supra. The Court's decision in Chattahoochee indirectly extended this rule's
application to cargo damage and thus expanded the scope of carrier's liability. Thus, car-
rier shares in the payment for its own cargo's damage if the amount of hull damage to the
noncarrying vessel combined with the dollar amount paid by noncarrier to cargo exceeds
the total hull damage of carrier. For example, if ship A suffers hull damage of $ 100,000, its
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hoochee thus indirectly exposed carrier to liability for damage to
its cargo although the carrier had been exempted from such liabil-
ity by the Harter Act.74
B. Unsuccessful Attempts to Avoid the Result of
The Chattahoochee
An international conference75 and a contractual provision
known as the both-to-blame clause 76 presented two distinct oppor-
tunities for avoiding the Chattahoochee result. Neither succeeded,
however, in extracting the rule from American admiralty law.
The Brussels Collision Convention, signed in 1910 by The
Third International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law,
77
would have replaced the Chattahoochee rule with a rule of pro-
portionate fault. Article 4 of the Convention provides in part:
If two or more vessels are in fault the liabiliy of each vessel
is in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively commit-
ted. Provided that if, having regard to the circumstances, it is
not possible to establish the degree of the respective faults, or if
it appears that the faults are equal, the liability is apportioned
equally.
The damages caused, either to the vessels or to their cargoes
• . . are borne by the vessels in fault in the above propor-
tions .... 78
The Convention expresses the principle that cargo must partici-
pate in collision damage liability to the extent of carrer's propor-
tionate fault.79  This principle has been accepted by all major
maritime nations"° except the United States, which clings tena-
ciously to the notion that the "innocent" nature of cargo justifies
cargo is damaged to the extent of $100,000, and ship B also has damages of $100,000, B
will pay A's cargo $100,000. B thus has incurred total damages of $200,000, and now has
an action against A for $50,000, which in this case represents cargo damage liability for
which A was exempted by the Harter Act.
74. The proportionate fault rule of Reliable Transfer alters the operation of the rule of
Chattahoochee only by limiting noncarrier's contribution claim to an amount in proportion
to carrier's fault rather than for 50% regardless of fault.
75. See notes 77-85 infra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 88-94 infra and accompanying text.
77. Donovan & Ray, Mutual Fault-Haf Damage Rule-A Critical Analysis, 41 INS.
COUNSEL J. 395 (1974).
78. Brussels Collision Convention, supra note 12, at 1338.
79. Notably, the language of the second paragraph specifically supports the result
reached by the court in Alamo Chem. Transp. Co. v. M/V Overseas Valdes, 469 F. Supp.
203 (E.D. La. 1979), which applied the proportionate fault rule of Reliable Transfer to a
cargo damage claim. See notes 126-44 infra and accompanying text.
80. England, however, follows a slightly different rule. See note 49 supra.
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its one hundred percent recovery of damages. 81
The Brussels Convention was quickly ratified by most mar-
itime nations.82 It was not submitted to the United States Senate
until 1937, however, and after bitter opposition by cargo interests
was withdrawn by the President in 1947.3 Notwithstanding its
withdrawal from the Senate, the Convention was favored by Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. 84 The Committee's report concluded that ratification
would change American law in two significant respects: the rule
of divided damages would be replaced by a rule of proportionate
fault and The Chattahoochee would be overruled so that propor-
tionate fault would apply to cargo damage claims without joint
liability.85 Although Reliable Transfer accomplished the first and
most important change, cargo's right of recovery for damage re-
mains at odds with the law of other maritime nations. This incon-
sistency promotes forum shopping as cargo interests seek to have
their claims adjudicated in the United States. 6
Shipowners not suject to the Brussels Convention found their
own way to avoid the Chattahoochee rule. In an individual effort
to avoid one hundred percent liability for damage to another ves-
sel's cargo, they added contractual provisions known as "both-to-
blame" clauses87 to bills of lading. If a collision occurred with the
81. A. KNAUTH, supra note 55, at 210-11 (4th ed. 1953). The Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Reliable Trans/er may be a shift away from this traditional view. The language used
by the Court in establishing the proportionate fault rule resembles closely the language in
the first paragraph of Article Four of the Convention. 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Brandon, supra note 54. Most nations, but not the United States, sup-
ported the concept of proportionate fault before the signing of the Brussels Collision Con-
vention. For an interesting and informative record of international commentary on
proportionate fault and liability for cargo damage, see INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COMM.,
LONDON CONFERENCE 1899 ON THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA AND SHIPOWNER'S LIA-
BILITY (1899). See also Comment, The Difficult Questfor a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure
of the Brussels Conventions to Achieve InternationalAgreement on Collision Liability, Liens,
and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878 (1955).
83. See Owen, supra note 29, at 221.
84. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MARITIME COLLISION CONVENTION,
Ex. REP. No. 4, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939), reprinted in 1939 American Maritime Cases
[A.M.C.] 1051.
85. Id, 1939 A.M.C. at 1052.
86. Kasanin, supra note 11, at 892-94.
87. The standard both-to-blame clause states:
If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the negligence of
the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the Master, mariner, pilot or the
servants of the Carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the
owners of the goods carried hereunder will indemnify the Carrier against all loss
or liability to the other or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as such loss or
liability represents loss of, or damage to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners of
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clause in effect, cargo could recover one hundred percent of its
damages from noncarrier, but then would have an obligation to
pay carrier the amount which carrier had paid to noncarrier in
satisfaction of the latter's claim for contribution. Because both-to-
blame clauses accomplished circuitously the same end as the Brus-
sels Collision Convention, they served the salutary function of
conforming American admiralty practice to that of other nations,
thereby eliminating one cause of international forum shopping.
Despite this beneficial effect, both-to-blame clauses were ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1952.8 The Court rea-
soned that it was against public policy to allow carrier to deprive
cargo of the fruits of a suit against noncarrier 89 or to stipulate
against its own negligence.90 Justice Frankfurter, in a strong dis-
sent, argued that it was senseless to deny carrier the right to con-
tract out of a liability from which it had been legislatively
exempted. 9' In response to the majority's public policy argument,
Frankfurter asserted that in the Harter Act, Congress had deter-
mined public policy by providing carrier with a statutory exemp-
tion from liabiliy for negligence and that the Court was no longer
free to reformulate policy to the contrary.92
Both the debate over ratification of the Brussels Collision Con-
vention and the controvery produced by the introduction of both-
to-blame clauses illustrate the tension which exists between the
goals of equating liability with fault and providing "innocent"
cargo with a full recovery. For more than a century, this tension
has been adjusted by legislative and judicial rules which have
often been inconsistent.93 While these rules have not eased the
tension, they have laid the groundwork for a balanced reconcilia-
tion of the opposing interests of shipowner and cargo. Reliable
Transfer is a positive step towards the achievement of that goal
said goods, paid or payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners to the
owners of said goods and set-off, recouped or recovered by the other or non-
carrying ship or her owners as part of their claim against the carrying ship or
Carrier.
United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 238 n.5 (1952).
88. Id at 242. Both-to-blame clauses are permissible in private contracts of carriage
because the bill of lading for such carriage is not a negotiable instrument. American Union
Transp., Inc. v. United States, 1976 A.M.C. 1480 (N.D. Cal.).
89. 343 U.S. at 240.
90. Id at 239.
91. Id at 247-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The exemption from liability to cargo
for damage arising from negligent navigation appears in the Harter Act § 3, 46 U.S.C.
§ 192, and COGSA § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a).
92. 343 U.S. at 245 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
93. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
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insofar as it institutes a rule of proportionate fault. Yet, recent
district court decisions indicate that the principles of Reliable
Transfer have not been applied consistently to cargo damage
claims.
III. THE APPLICATION OF RELIABLE TRANSFER TO CARGO
DAMAGE CLAIMS IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
The precise issue addressed by this Note, whether the propor-
tionate fault rule of Reliable Transfer compels the modification or
abolition of joint and several liability,94 has reached the federal
district courts twice since Reliable Transfer. Although the facts of
the cases varied significantly, both courts were required to decide
the proper extent of cargo's recovery from noncarrier. The two
courts reached contrary conclusions on the issue, and yet, neither
result was the most equitable."
A. Flota and Alamo: Imposing Disproportionate Liability?
The dispute underlying Complaint of Flota Mercante Granco-
lombiana, S.A. 96 arose from a collision involving the M/VRepub-
lica De Colombia and the S.S. Transhawaii. The Colombia safely
overtook and passed the Transhawaii, leaving one-half mile be-
tween the two ships. When the Colombia was three-quarters of a
mile ahead of the Transhawaii, a power outage in the wheelhouse
of the Colombia caused her to lose steerage and sheer off to port
across the bow of the Transhawaii. The Transhawaii failed to take
evasive action and struck the Colombia amidships, causing exten-
sive damage to the vessel and cargo.97
The District Court for the Southern District of New York de-
termined that the Colombia was guilty of both negligent naviga-
tion and unseaworthiness.9 8 While liability does not
automatically flow from a finding of unseaworthiness, the Colom-
bia was unable to sustain the burden of proof necessary to rebut
the presumption that it failed to exercise due diligence to provide
94. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 97-151 infra and accompanying text.
96. 440 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The action in this case was in the form of a
petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability under the Limitation of Shipowners'
Liablity Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). The claims of cargo owners were consolidated in the
same proceeding. 440 F. Supp. at 707.
97. 440 F. Supp. at 713.
98. Id at 718.
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a seaworthy vessel.99 It was thus denied limitation of liability °°
and immunity from suit by cargo.' 0 ' The Transhawaii was also
found at fault for failing to keep a proper lookout. 0 2 Since the
Transhawaii as noncarrier was at fault, the rule of The Chattahoo-
chee "3 entitled cargo carried aboard the Colombia to seek recov-
ery from the Transhawaii. The question then became the extent to
which cargo could recover.
To resolve this question, the court first determined the relative
fault of the two ships; it found the Transhawaii 17.5% at fault and
the Colombia 82.5% at fault."° Next, the court recognized that
the Reliable Transfer rule of proportionate fault was subject to two
possible interpretations:
One question which the [Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer]
did not deal with was whether this new proportional damage
rule changes the right of innocent cargo owners to obtain a full
recovery from the non-carrying vessel. Within the specific con-
text of this case, the Court must decide whether, as before, the
Cargo Claimants can recover 100% of their damages from the
Transhawaii, or whether they are now limited to a recovery of
the proportion of fault attributable to the Transhawaii.'0 5
Having thus narrowed the issue to whether joint and several
liability survived Reliable Transfer, the Flota court avoided a di-
rect resolution of the issue by relying on early cases which estab-
99. Id at 724. Section 4(1) of COGSA provides: "Whenever loss or damage has re-
sulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be
on the carrier or other persons claiming exemption under this section." COGSA § 4(1), 46
U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976).
100. The right to limit liability to the value of the vessesl after the occurrence plus any
pending freight is contingent upon the owner's exercising due diligence to provide a sea-
worthy vessel. Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
101. 440 F. Supp. at 724.
102. Id at 716-17.
103. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
104. 440 F. Supp. at 726. The proportionate fault rule may revitalize a dispute con-
cerning the respective weight to be given to causative and culpable fault. The court in
Floa indicated that the negligent seamanship of Columbia's Chief Mate (causative fault)
in failing to blow five whistles or stop engines after the steering gear malfunctioned was of
a "high order." Id at 726. On the other hand, its owner's failure to exercise reasonable
prudence in ascertaining the seaworthy condition of the ship (culpable fault) was regarded
as only "[aidditional weight in the scales." Id
One district court has stated that the Reliable Transfer mandate of comparative fault
requires a comparison of relative culpability rather than relative degrees of physical causa-
tion. Afran Transp. Co. v. S/T Marie Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621, 636 n. Il (E.D. Pa.
1978).
105. 440 F. Supp. at 725. One author expresses the view that the authorities who have
considered the issue support the 100% or "ultimate" liability interpretation. Owen, supra
note 29, at 804 (citing Vana Trading Co. v. S.S. Mette Skou, 556 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977)). See also Kasanin, supra note 11.
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lished the right of cargo to recover a joint and several judgment
against the noncarrying vessel. Specifically, the court cited The
Atlas 0 6 to support its decision that cargo was entitled to a one
hundred percent recovery from the Transhawaii.'"7 In The Atlas,
the Supreme Court held that cargo damaged in a collision involv-
ing two or more vessels was entitled to a joint and several recovery
against any of the at-fault vessels." 8 Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that if the Harter Act raised any doubt as to whether cargo's
damage was to be fully compensated, The Chattahoochee resolved
the doubt in cargo's favor by expressly holding that cargo could
recover one hundred percent damages from the noncarrying ves-
sel. 109
To justfy its decision, the Flota court simply stated, without
elaboration, that Chattahoochee was the "better" rule and that a
one hundred percent recovery for cargo was consistent with the
principles of Reliable Transfer." ° Moreover, the court reasoned
that joint and several liability should be retained because cargo
was not at fault' and because the Supreme Court had not explic-
itly overruled prior cases." 2 Without such a directive, the court
refused to impute the fault of carrier to cargo.' 13
It is beyond doubt that Atlas and Chattahoochee authorized a
joint and several recovery for cargo. Nevertheless, the Flota
court's reliance on these cases avoids the question of whether Reli-
able Transfer altered the applicability of joint and several liability
to cargo damage cases. Indeed, such reliance illustrates a general
tendency of courts to adhere uncritically to existing admiralty
rules.
This blind adherence to precedent is inconsistent with the ad-
miralty courts' duty to administer flexible and fair rules.' "4 The
Supreme Court's holding in Reliable Transfer reflects such flex-
ibility, but does not deal specifically with the rule respecting cargo
damage. 1 15 However, the general rule that admiralty courts have
106. 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
107. 440 F. Supp. at 724.
108. 93 U.S. at 317.
109. 440 F. Supp. at 724 (citing The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899)).
110. 440 F. Supp. at 725.
Ill. Id
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1138
(9th Cir. 1977) (citing Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953)).
115. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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broad equitable powers" 6 to fashion flexible rules strongly sug-
gests that the lower federal courts are empowered by Reliable
Transfer to establish new rules of cargo damage allocation. In
this respect, Reliable Transfer may, in fact, be a directive to the
lower courts to consider alternatives to joint and several liability
for cargo damage.
In formulating alternatives, 117 courts should compare the theo-
retical basis of the divided damages rule with that of the propor-
tionate fault rule. The Supreme Court's discussion of divided
damages in The North Star..8 made it clear that all damages re-
sulting from a collision were to be "made into one mass."" 9 In
addition, the Court was not concerned with the degree of fault of
the parties. As long as each defendant had contributed in any de-
gree to the "mass" of damages, the liability of each would simply
be a function of the total dollar amount of damage divided by the
number of tortfeasors.' 20 Joint and several liability is consistent
with this method of dividing damages because each tortfeasor's
liability is dependent solely upon the number of negligent parties.
The proportionate fault rule, on the other hand, does not arbitrar-
ily divide total damages among the parties. Each party's fault is
determined independently of the amount of damages or number
of parties involved. The goal is no longer to assure that all dam-
ages will be compensated, rather it is to determine the precise level
of each party's fault.' 2 1
The court in Flota determined that the Transhawai was 17.5%
116. "A court of admiralty is, as to matters falling within its jurisdiction, a court of
equity. Its hands are not tied up by the rigid and technical rules of the common law, but it
administers justice upon the large and liberal principles of courts which exercise a general
equity jurisdiction." Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting
Justice Story's statement in The David Pratt, 7 F. Cas. 22 (D. Me. 1839)). See notes 164-67
infra and accompanying text for discussion of the role of equity in fashioning a new rule to
govern cargo damage claims.
117. See notes 160-71 infra and accompanying text.
118. 106 U.S. 17 (1882).
119. Id at 21.
120. I d
121. Notably, the rule of comparative negligence weakens one of the primary reasons
for granting plaintiffajoint and several judgment. At common law only a "pure" plaintiff
recovered a joint and several judgment, as the rule of contributory negligence prevented a
culpable plaintiff from recovering anything. Thus, a joint and several judgment for an
"innocent" plaintiff offset the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. See generally
Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978) (where the court adopted comparative
negligence without joint and several liability). Because contributory negligence has never
been a bar to recovery in admiralty, "innocent" cargo does not have so compelling an
argument for a joint and several judgment as an "innocent" plaintiff in a land-based tort
action.
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at fault; holding that vessel liable for 100% of cargo damage was
thus contrary to the principle of Reliable Transfer. The court ex-
plicitly admitted that a tension existed between its holding and the
proportionate fault rule. 2' Yet, it adhered to the rule of joint and
several liability because it did not regard itself as authorized to
formulate a new rule which conflicted with The Chattahoochee
and The Atlas.
A number of considerations suggest that the Flota court was
wrong in its assessment of the narrowness of its role. First, a court
sitting in admiralty has broad equitable powers to fashion just and
suitable remedies. 23 Second, the conflict between the proportion-
ate fault rule and the joint recovery rule of The Chattahoochee
provided an appropriate opportunity to invoke that equitable
power.' 24 Finally, it is not entirely clear that public policy is bet-
ter served by requiring the noncarrier rather than cargo to bear
the risk that one or more of the at-fault parties will fail to respond
in damages proportionate to its adjudged level of fault.'2 5
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana adopted a bolder tack in Alamo Chemical Transporta-
tion Co. v. M/V Overseas Valdes, 26 which involved a collision
between the M/V Overseas Valdes and the barge Sun-Chem 900
in tow of the tug Hardwork.2 7 Alamo Chemical Transportation
Company, owner of the tug, brought an action against the Over-
seas Valdes and the vessel's operator, Maritime Overseas Com-
pany.'28  The operator counterclaimed for hull damage to its
vessel. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, owner of the
cargo aboard the barge, intervened through its subrogated under-
writer' 29 against both vessels and their owners. 30
122. 440 F. Supp. at 725. The Flora court acknowledged that limitation of liability or
insolvency of carrier would make a judgment against Transhawaii for 100% of cargo dam-
ages unfair and contrary to Reliable Transfer's command of liability in proportion to fault.
The court declined to respond to the argument, however, as it had denied Colombia's limi-
tation of liability petition. Id at 723.
123. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 160-66 infra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text.
126. 469 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. La. 1979).
127. Id. at 204.
128. Id.
129. Clause 13 of the "Barge Charter Party", which is a private contract of carriage (as
explained in note 131 infra), required a waiver of subrogation by the cargo underwriter.
Because Firestone failed to obtain the waiver, the underwriter pursued cargo's claim. Id
at 211.
130. Id at 204.
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Since the cargo in Alamo was carried under a private contract
of carriage, 3 ' neither the bill of lading 32 nor the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) governed the rights and obligations
of the parties. Nevertheless, clause 18 of the contract assigned
rights and obligations in the same manner as if COGSA gov-
erned. 33 Having met the threshold test of exercising due dili-
gence in providing a seaworthy vessel,' 34 Alamo Chemical
became eligible for a COGSA-type exemption for negligent navi-
gation. 35
Finding that the private carriage in this case was governed by
common carriage rules, the court squarely faced the same issue
which the Flota136 court had resolved earlier. The court, however,
interpreted Reliable Transfer more broadly and reached a differ-
ent conclusion. It viewed the proportionate fault rule as an au-
thorization from the Supreme Court to create such rules as might
be necessary to apply fairly the holding of Reliable Transfer to
unforeseen factual circumstances. Accordingly, the court held
that cargo no longer had an unqualified right to recover full dam-
ages from noncarrier, but was limited to a recovery proportionate
to noncarrier's fault. 37
In reaching its holding, the district court relied upon the
Supreme Court's language that any "allocation of disparate pro-
portional fault" was "unnecessarily crude and inequitable."''
38
Since it found the Overseas Valdes (noncarrier) twenty percent at
fault, 139 the court reasoned that holding it liable for one hundred
percent of cargo's damage would be in "violent contradiction" of
Reliable Transfer.4 ° The court thus implicitly held that The At-
las 4 ' and The Chattahoochee42 did not survive Reliable Transfer.
To do so presupposed that the aversion to "disparate proportional
131. A contract for carriage, or "affreightment", is "private" when there is only one
shipper who secures the entire carrying capacity of the vessel. Chiang, The Characterization
ofa Vessel as a Common or Private Carrier, 48 TUL. L. REv. 299 (1974).
132. The bill of lading was not a negotiable instrument but merely a receipt for storage
of the cargo.
133. 469 F. Supp. at 212.
134. Id at 213.
135. COGSA § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976).
136. See notes 96-113 supra and accompanying text.
137. 469 F. Supp. at 214.
138. Id (quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. at 407).
139. Id at 205.
140. Id at 214.
141. 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
142. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
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fault" expressed by the Supreme Court 14 3 referred to the fault of
the vessels involved and not to that of cargo.
The Alamo court's abolition of joint and several liability does
not avoid disproportionate liability, but merely shifts the risk of it
to cargo. The argument may still be made that "innocent" cargo
deserves a one hundred percent recovery. Nevertheless, the deci-
sion in Alamo establishes the rule that shipowners' liability is fixed
by fault and that the risk of noncompensation for cargo damage
due to exemption from or limitation of liability rests with cargo
owners or underwriters. This position depends upon the court's
conviction that a shifting of risk will contribute to the attainment
of desirable public policy goals. 44
If the Alamo holding were restricted to cases involving valid
both-to-blame clauses, 145 it could be regarded as a compatible ex-
ception to the joint and several holding of Flota. The scope of the
Alamo decision, however, is not so limited, as the court held that
there could never be a joint and several recovery for cargo dam-
age against noncarrier. 146 Although this holding abandons a long-
accepted rule and necessarily requires a broad interpretation of
the mandate of Reliable Transfer, it resolves the anomaly of deny-
ing cargo any recovery when carrier is solely at fault, but allowing
cargo a one hundred percent recovery if any other party is in any
degree at fault. Furthermore, the denial of a joint and several re-
covery sets aside the incongruity established by The Chattahoo-
chee in which the Supreme Court reinstated the liability from
which carriers had been exempted by Congress. 14  Finally, the
Alamo rule provides an incentive for careful seamanship, as cargo
owners, knowing that carrier's fault will be imputed to them, will
employ the most prudent carrier available.'
48
Despite the arguments supporting an abolition or modification
ofjoint and several liability for cargo damage, and the rule's theo-
143. 421 U.S. at 407.
144. See notes 155-61 infra and accompanying text.
145. The Barge Charter Party contained a both-to-blame clause which was valid be-
cause the carriage was private. American Union Transp. v. United States, 1976 A.M.C.
1480.
146. 469 F. Supp. at 215.
147. Harter Act § 3. 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976). For a history of this Act and subsequent
judicial action, see notes 56-74 supra and accompanying text.
148. Several arguments in favor of the abolition of joint and several liability for cargo
damage were discussed by a commentator who advocated ratification of the 1910 Brussels
Collision Convention by the United States. Ratification would have accomplished virtu-
ally the same result as that mandated by Alamo. Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in
Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928).
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retical basis in Reliable Transfer, a recent Supreme Court decision
suggests that the Court might sustain the rule of joint and several
liability. In Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,149
the Supreme Court ruled on the liability of a shipowner for inju-
ries sustained by a longshoreman.'5 ° A jury had found damages
of $100,000 and had determined that the plaintiff longshoreman
was ten percent at fault; seventy percent of the fault was allocated
to his stevedore employer and twenty percent to the shipowner. ' 5'
The Court, which was called upon to determine the extent of the
shipowner's liability for damages '5 held that the shipowner was
liable for all damages not due to the negligence of the longshore-
man.153
In holding that the longshoreman was entitled to a joint and
several judgment against all negligent parties not statutorily ex-
empt, 54 the Court recognized the tension between its holding and
the Reliable Transfer rule of proportionate fault.'55 The Court,
however, attempted to minimize the conflict with Reliable Trans-
fer in two ways. First, it reasoned that the rules governing liabil-
ity between longshoremen, shipowners, and stevedores had been
recently put in delicate balance by Congress, 56 and that this bal-
ance should not be disturbed by the abolition of joint and several
liability. Second, in a footnote to its opinion, 157 the Court stated
that Reliable Transfer "did not upset the rule that the plaintiff may
recover from one of the colliding vessels the damage concurrently
caused by the negligence of both."'' 58
The Court's reasoning in Edmonds should not prevent the
modification of joint and several liability with respect to cargo
damage by lower federal courts. Cargo's rights, in contrast to
longshoremen's, have not recently been put in "delicate balance."
Moreover, the command of Reliable Transfer that liability must be
149. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
150. Id
151. Id at 258.
152. Id at 271-73. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 905-910 (1976), an injured longshoreman does not have an action for
damages against his employer, but is entitled to a statutory level of compensation. Id
§ 905. For a discussion of the history of the amended Act, see [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4698.
153. 443 U.S. at 271.
154. See note 152 supra.
155. 443 U.S. at 271-72.
156. Id at 273.
157. Id at 271 n.30.
158. Id
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equated with fault should not be modified by dicta in a footnote.
Lower courts must exercise their "broad powers of interstitial
rulemaking' ' 59 to maximize cargo's recovery without burdening
the noncarrier with disproportionate liability.
B. Fashioning New Rules to Effect Proportionate Liability
Under the theory of joint and several liability, any one defend-
ant can be held vicariously liable for the fault of other defend-
ants. 160 It is a theory conceived to assist plaintiffs in recovering
full damages and is justified by the availability of an action for
contribution against those defendants who, for some reason, do
not compensate the plaintiff. A number of considerations, both
practical and theoretical, suggest that joint and several liability
cannot effectuate the proportionate liability requirement of Relia-
ble Transfer.
First, because carrier's limitation of liability 16' often precludes
contribution, the longstanding Chattahoochee rule of one hundred
percent liability of noncarrier cannot be justified adequately by a
recital of noncarrier's right to claim contribution from carrier.
Second, Reliable Transfer dictates that each party should be liable
only in proportion to fault. It thus makes little sense to hold a
noncarrier vicariously liable for an act which, when committed by
the carrier, is not actionable. Third, it is questionable whether
cargo damage is indivisible after Reliable Transfer. If the injury is
divisible and the causation of each part can be separately as-
signed, joint and several liability would be inappropriate as
demonstrated by the court's decision in Alamo.'62 When the court
determined that the Overseas Valdes (noncarrier) was twenty per-
cent at fault, 163 it divided the injury and separately assigned cau-
sation.
In fashioning a better rule of cargo damage allocation, a
number of guidelines should be observed.' 64 Courts must recog-
nize their capacity to apply equitable principles when adjudicating
maritime disputes. 165 The nature of this power has been described
159. Id at 276 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 319 (1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875
(1977).
161. The Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A(l) & 881 (1977).
163. 469 F. Supp. at 205.
164. See notes 117-21 supra and accompanying text.
165. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935).
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as follows:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the neces-
sities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished" it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument of nice adjustment and reconcilia-
tion between public interest andprivate needs as well as be-
tween competing private claims.
t
Rules designed to meet this ideal should be as simple as possible
and yet sophisticated enough to accommodate conflicting judicial
and statutory policy and law. Above all, flexibility is important in
finding an equitable solution in each case. Inflexible rules such as
that of joint and several liability as used by the court in Flotat 67 or
that of proportionate liability only, as used by the court in
Alamo, 68 will work injustice when applied to cases complicated
by the issues of private carriage, immunities, or limitation of lia-
bility.
The starting point in seeking a "nice adjustment" of cargo
damage liability must be Reliable Transfer. Accordingly, the ulti-
mate goal is to achieve a resolution which closely equates liability
with fault. Such a resolution must address the fundamental issue
of who should bear the loss associated with limitation of liability,
insolvency, or nonjoinder of parties. If carrier can limit its liabil-
ity, the rule of joint and several liability automatically assigns the
loss to noncarrier. With respect to the fault of carrier, however,
noncarrier is no more blameworthy than cargo.
Alternatively, if the risk is placed on cargo rather than noncar-
rier, cargo will be more likely to insist on high standards of safety
from its carrier. Insurance resources would be more efficiently al-
located as cargo would be in a position to assess more accurately
the risk structure of the enterprise. Furthermore, cargo will be
induced to join all possible defendants in one suit. With all par-
ties present, courts can more readily determine the proportionate
fault of each vessel and the extent of their respective limitation
funds. ' 69
166. The Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
167. 440 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. 469 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. La. 1979).
169. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. Under the current limitation of liabil-
ity provisions, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976), the fund would consist of the value of the
vessel after the collision plus any outstanding freight. For example: Vessels A and B are
25% and 75% negligent, respectively. Cargo aboard A is damaged to the extent of $200,000.
A, as carrier, is not liable under COGSA to cargo for 25% of the damages, or $50,000. The
court determines that A's limitation of liability fund consists of $25,000: $20,000 for value
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To achieve the goal of equating liability with fault, courts
should hold the noncarrier liable to the extent of noncarrier's fault
plus any part of carrier's liability which will be recoverable by
contribution. This application of joint and several liability does
not hold noncarrier liable for the fault of carrier, but merely em-
ploys noncarrier as a conduit through which cargo may recover
damage attributable to carrier. 70
The facility and logical consistency with which cargo damage
liability is allocated is impaired by the current limitaton of liabil-
ity and immunity provisions. Reliable Transfer cannot be readily
applied to cargo damage claims while these two aspects of admi-
ralty law continue in their present form. Limitation of liability
interferes with the contribution necessary to the fair operation of
joint and several liability. The long list of excepted causes of
cargo damage in COGSAI7 ' needlessly confuses liability determi-
nation. Both domestically and internationally, pressure is being
exerted to change these rules.' 72 Thus, in fashioning interstitial
rules, courts should be aware that a modification of joint and sev-
eral liability is justified not only by the holding of Reliable Trans-
fer but also by the promise of legislative changes in shipowners'
rights.
of the vessel and $5,000 for value of pending freight. B is liable to cargo for 75% of the
total damages, or $150,000, and has a limitation of liability fund of $200,000. All parties
having been joined, the court enters a decree holding B liable to cargo for $175,000. This
amount is equal to B's proportionate liability as is covered by A's limitation fund, in this
case, $25,000. A is then held liable to B for $25,000. B has thus paid in accordance with
Reliable Transfer and cargo has suffered a loss due to the partial judgment-proof condition
of A.
170. The concept of noncarrier acting as a conduit through which damages pass from
carrier to cargo is the real basis for The Chattahoochee, see notes 70-73 supra and accom-
panying text. While the Supreme Court intended to overcome the impediment to cargo's
full recovery imposed by the Harter Act exemptions, the promise of contribution from
carrier was empty even then, as carriers had already been granted the right to limit liability.
46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976). It is inevitable that the limitation of liability rules will be
changed so that the limitation fund for property damage will be greatly expanded. When
this occurs, joint and several liability will be less objectionable, as noncarrier will have a
more realistic possibility of recovering what it pays cargo for carrier's damage.
171. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)-(q). See note 57 supra.
172. Many admiralty practitioners believe that limitation of liability will be signifi-
cantly changed if not completely abolished. MARITIME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 619 at
7087 (dissenting report) (May 4, 1979). The excepted causes in COGSA for the U.S., and
in the Hague Rules for other nations, were deemed disruptive and the consensus favored
change. See generally Hellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier, 27
AM. J. COMp. L. 357 (1979).
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IV. NEW STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
In a situation where a carrier has limited, or been completely
exonerated from liability for cargo damage, the application of
joint and several liability is particularly inequitable, and has
therefore been subject to recent criticism worldwide.'7 3 While
change in these statutory rules is inevitable, an interim rule is
needed to reconcile them with the proportionate fault rule of Reli-
able Transfer.
Limitation of shipowners' liability was introduced by statute in
the United States in 1851. t7 This enactment, which limited
liabilty to the value of the owner's interest in the vessel and pend-
ing freight at the end of the voyage, 75 remains unchanged to-
day. 176 This generally low limit frustrates recovery by cargo in its
action for damages and precludes noncarrier from successfully
pursuing a contribution action against carrier. In 1957, an inter-
national convention adopted a resolution which established a
larger limitation fund out of which property damage judgments
could be satisfied.' 7 This convention has not been ratified by the
United States.'78
In 1976, the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Mari-
time Claims drafted a proposal for new rules.' 79 These rules were
eventually submitted to the Maritime Law Association for consid-
eration as a new Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act.'8 0 This
proposed legislation would repeal the current Act' 81 and replace it
with a new formula for establishing a limitation fund. The new
formula will relate the amount of the fund to the size of the carry-
ing vessel.' 8
2
173. Seeid
174. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976)).
175. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 122 (1871).
176. See 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
177. The Brussels Limitation of Liability Convention, reprinted in 1957 A.M.C.
1972-80.
178. Volk & Cobbs, Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REv. 953, 984 (1977).
179. The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, reprinted in
MARITME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 619, at 7100-15 (May 4, 1979).
180. The proposed legislation was submitted by the Joint Committee on the Comite
Maritime Internationale and on Limitation of Liability. Id at 7075.
181. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976).
182. The new formula for computing the limitation fund will provide for a larger dollar
amount for a larger vessel:
Vessel tonnage less than 500-$500,000.
For each ton between 501 and 30,000-$200.
For each ton between 30,001 and 70,000-$150.
For each ton in excess of 70,000-$100.
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Today, a 200,000-ton tanker destroyed by a collision and fire
might limit its liability to several hundred thousand dollars. As-
sume further that the crude oil which it carried had a value of
approximately $50,000,000. Under current law noncarrier would
be liable for the difference. The proposed limitation formula con-
sidered by the Maritime Law Association, would in this instance
provide a fund of $25,400,000. t 3 Under this Note's proposed
rule, 84 noncarrier would pay its proportionate part of the
$50,000,000 damage plus up to $25,400,000 of carrier's fault. If
any amount remained, as would be the case if carrier's fault ex-
ceeded 25.4/50 of the total, this portion of the damage would be
borne by cargo. Thus, the new limitation statute provides for an
equitable division of cargo damages and, when applied in con-
junction with this Note's modification of joint and several liabil-
ity, would closely approach the ideal of Reliable Transfer.8 5
Paralleling the pressure for change of limitation rules is a simi-
lar movement with respect to the basic liability rules of ocean car-
riage. The goal of this movement is to align maritime tort rules
with liability rules in other contexts.' 86 A recent United Nations
conference 87 drafted an Act, the Hamburg Rules, that would, if
adopted, establish a new liability standard. Article 5(1) of the
Hamburg Rules provides:
The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to
the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence
which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the
goods were in his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the car-
rier proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences.' 8'
This standard abolishes the immunities of COGSA. Furthermore,
See Proposed Limitation Act § 6(l)(b) supra Note 25.
183. Proposed Limitation Act § 6, supra note 25.
184. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
185. One problem with the new limitation provision, which could be solved by the use
of insurance, is that the limitation amounts are not expressed in dollars but in "units of
account." Article 8 of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims
defines the "unit of account" as the Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary
Fund. MARITIME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 619 at 7104 (May 4, 1979). The SDR is the
same as the Poincar6 franc or 65.5 mg. gold. Rein, International Variations on Concepts of
Limitation ofLiabiliy, 53 TUL. L. REv. 1259, 1266 (1979). Although this system is subject
to fluctuating gold prices, it furthers uniformity as no one currency is the standard of valua-
tion.
186. See Hellawell, supra note 172, at 359.
187. The Hamburg Rules, supra note 23.
188. Id at 6827.
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because the carrier is presumed at fault, the problem of The Chat-
tahoochee will not arise. It is not clear what precise standard of
care would be required to avoid liability, although it may prove to
be the same standard that is used to determine whether damage
has been caused by the excepted cause of "perils of the sea." '189
That is, the shipowner would not be liable for the fortuitous action
of the sea forcible enough to overcome a seaworthy vessel and the
conscientious efforts of good seamanship. 9
Article 5(7) of the Hamburg Rules addresses the problem of
cargo damage arising from multiple tortfeasors:
Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents combines with another cause to produce loss, damage or
delay in delivery the carrier is liable only to the extent that the
loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault or
neglect, provided that the carrier proves the amount of the loss,
damage or delay in delivery attributable thereto.'
91
This language imposes a heavy burden upon the carrier' 92 as it
requires carrier to pay one hundred percent of cargo's damage un-
less it can prove the level of fault attributable to other causes.
Carrier was unable to sustain this burden of proof in Vana Trading
Co. v. S.S. Mette Skou 193 and thus was held liable for one hun-
dred percent of the liability for damage to a cargo of yams.' 9
4
This stringent burden is counterproductive to the goal of pro-
portionate fault because it threatens carrier with liability for all
damage to cargo even when it is clear that some proportion of the
damage was due to another cause. Moreover, it is contrary to the
burden of proof applied in other contexts. For example, when
considering a claim for hull damage courts apportion liability af-
ter the parties have met the burden of going forward with some
evidence of another's fault. 95 With respect to cargo damage, the
Hamburg Rules do not reach a satisfactory middle ground; the
189. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(c) (1976).
190. Chiswick Prod. Ltd. v. S.S. Stolt Avance, 387 F.2d 645, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1968); G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 162.
191. MARITIME L.A. OF THE U.S., Doe. No. 613 at 6828.
192. One commentator believes that the burden placed upon the carrier by the
Hamburg Rules may be a prod to safety and efficient use of insurance. See Hellawell,
supra note 172, at 366-67.
193. 556 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977). See also The Vallescura,
293 U.S. 296 (1934).
194. Liability was assigned because the shipowner was able to prove the precise level of
fault attributable to the excepted cause of insufficient packing, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(n)
(1976), and that attributable to the nonexcepted cause of failure to provide space which was
fit for the carriage and preservation of cargo, id § 1303(l)(c).
195. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19 at 486.
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risk is merely shifted from noncarrier to carrier. Thus, if the
Hamburg Rules are adopted by the United States, the burden of
proof in Article 5(7) should be interpreted to mean that carrier has
the burden of producing evidence only as to the extent of its own
fault. Such an interpretation avoids an assignment of dispropor-
tionate fault when the carrier is not able toprove the precise level
of its fault. A more equitable result will be obtained if the court is
required to make a proportionate allocation of liability based on
evidence regarding fault, or, in rare cases when no evidence is
available, allocate liability equally.
V. CONCLUSION
In Reliable Transfer, the Supreme Court ruled that liability
must be equated with fault whenever possible.196 The present
framework of statutory and judicial law prevents an easy applica-
tion of this rule to cargo damage cases. Nevertheless, this Note
asserts that the lower federal courts are duty-bound to reconcile
Reliable Transfer with existing law in specific factual situations as
they arise. The Note proposes a reconciliation which modifies
joint and several liability so that the risk associated with carrier's
avoidance or limitation of liability is shifted from noncarrier to
cargo. Such a shift is justified to induce cargo to select responsible
carriers, to facilitate the efficient use of insurance, and to allocate
liability in accord with the proportionate fault rule of Reliable
Transfer.197
Until Congress enacts new statutes which clearly establish the
rights and obligations of parties to ocean carriage, courts should
avoid the use of inflexible rules to settle cargo damage claims.
Rather, risk of loss should be assigned as equity and the facts of
each case compel. The rule proposed by this Note is one model
for courts to follow in the pursuit of this goal.
JOHN N. ADAMS
196. 421 U.S. at 411. (emphasis added)
197. This shift is also arguably justified by Reliable Transfer if its holding is inter-
preted, as this Note argues, to have implicitly altered the assumption that "innocent" cargo
damaged in a maritime collision is entitled to a full recovery. See notes 160-72 supra and
accompanying text.
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